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that the same test of measurement of the risk of fabrication is
at the core of this exception as well. The trial judge will have
neither excitement nor absolute contemporaneity to minimize
the danger of unreliability, and thus the balance may often tip
toward exclusion. In a statement such as Dick's the judge should
consider Dick's youth, the nature of the occurrence, and the time
elapsed since the event. If under all the circumstances, the trial
judge can still determine that the risk of fabrication is very
small and the out-of-court declaration is validly unavailable,
then the statement should be admitted.
The rules of evidence in Louisiana in the area of excited
utterances and present sense impressions are largely judgemade, developed within the structure of applicable statutes.
There would seem to be no reason why that development cannot
continue its progress toward clarity and consistency by careful
analysis of the recognized exceptions for excited utterances and
present sense impressions.
H. Alston Johnson III*

LOUISIANA'S PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACTS
Professional corporations are of coming importance in Louisiana due to the passage of the Louisiana Legal and Medical
Corporation Acts' and to the significant tax advantages which
gave impetus to their passage. Certain tax advantages accrue to
professionals practicing as employees rather than as owners.
These relate to (1) social security, 2 (2) tax deferring pension
subject to cross-examination; and the court has placed great emphasis recently
upon the importance of cross-examination. Though the Court recognizes that dying
declarations and testimony of deceased witnesses who had testified at a former
trial have been admitted against an accused, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407
(1965), its emphasis on the importance of cross-examination in court should
sound a warning signal to those who seek extension of hearsay exceptions.
* The writer wishes to express appreciation to Mr. James D. Davis of the
Alexandria bar for the use of a helpful seminar paper in the field of excited

utterances and a present sense impression written while a student at LSU Law
School.
1. Professional Law Corporation Act, LA. R.S. 12:801-815 (Supp. 1969)
Professional Medical Corporation Act, LA. R.S. 12:901-915 (Supp. 1969).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 3101-3121. There is no difference between Social Security benefits and those payable under Self-Employment provisions. However, the rates of contribution are lower under Social Security. Compare id.

§§ 3101 and 3111 with §§ 1401 and 1402(b) (1)(C).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 401-407. Under amendment to the above sections it is possible for partnerships to get this -tax advantage to a limited degree.
This is commonly called a "H.R. 10 plan." The amendment makes a distinction
between an owner-employee (one who owns more than 10% of the business) and
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plans, 3 (3) group term life insurance and medical benefits, 4 (4)
$5,000.00 in tax free death benefits payable to the deceased member's estate,5 (5) funneling earnings into investments for later
distribution,, and, finally, (6) electing to be taxed as a partnership if there are less than ten shareholders in the corporation. 7
The attractiveness of these tax advantages has caught the attention of the Commissioner, and for this reason the status of professional corporations is presently in doubt. The cases that have
arisen have been unanimous in their approval of the professional
corporation," but further litigation will be needed to add a degree
of stability to the law in this area. The purpose of this Comment
is to explore the professional corporation, its present status and
future vitality.
self-employed (one who owns 10% or less of the business). Id. §§ 401(c) (3)and
401(c) (1). Contributions cannot exceed 101o of earned income or $2,500.00,

whichever is less for an owner-employee. There is no limit on the amount that
can be contributed for a self-employed person, but there is a $2,500.000 limit on
deductibility. Id. §§401(d)(5)(A) and 404(e). The pension plan may use a
trust, annuity, mutual fund, United States Bonds or face-amount certificates. Id.
§§ 401(d), (f), and (g). An owner-employee cannot start collecting benefits until
unless he is injured or dies. Id. §401(d)(4)B. The ownerafter age 59
employee must begin collecting before age 70%. Id. § 401(a) (9). Premature distributions are penalized. Id. § 72(m)(5). In the case of a self-employed person
the plan must call for payment no later than age 70/2 or the year of retirement,
whichever is later. Id. § 401(a) (9). Benefits are taxed as deferred income and
lump sum payments are taxed as ordinary income. Id. § 72(n) (1), (2).
4. Id. § 162. Providing employees with these fringe -benefits is considered as
an ordinary and necessary business expense deductible under the above section.
5. Id. § 101(b). Note that the $5,000.00 exclusion is not given to a selfemployed individual. Id. § 101(b) (3).
6. If the corporation can demonstrate the necessity of withholding dividends,
such as for the purpose of buying its office building or a drug store, the corporation can withhold profits which may be distributed at a later date at capital
gains rates. Accumulated earnings tax may be imposed if accumulations are beyond the reasonable needs of the corporation. Id. §§ 531, 532.
The Louisiana Legal and Medical Acts state that the professional corporation
shall engage in no business other than the practice of law or medicine, but it
may hold property for investment or in connection with its legal or medical practice. LA. R.S. 12:804, 904 (Supp. 1969).
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-1377. By becoming a "tax option" corporation, double taxation is avoided while many of the tax advantages are retained. The requirements for naking this election are the following: 1. It must
have 10 shareholders or less. 2. All shareholders must be individuals or estates.
3. It must have only one class of stock. 4. It must not have a nonresident alien as
a shareholder. Election under the Louisiana Professional Corporation Acts should
be exercised with caution because although it states that only one class of stock
is authorized, transmission of shares to a nonprofessional causes a suspension of
the right to vote or participate in earnings. Thus there may be two classes of
shares, those which vote and share in profits and those which do not. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1968).
8. Empey v. United States, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969) ; O'Neill v. United
St. Louis Park Medical Center v.
States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968)
Lethert, 286 F. Supp. 271 (D. Minn. 1968) ; Kurzner v. United States, 286 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968) ; Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D.
Ga. 1968) ; Wallace v. United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9669 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
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HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

Corporations have always been taxed on their income as separate entities and at different rates from individuals. The Internal
Revenue Code defines the term corporation as including associations.9 Difficulty arises when an association is not incorporated
but has the attributes of a corporation. It seems logical to surmise that Congress, by including association in the definition of
corporation, envisioned situations where an unincorporated business entity would be taxed as a corporation. The business entities
which first incurred the attention of the Commissioner as possibly being included within the term association were the socalled Massachusetts trusts or business trusts."
Under the usual trust agreement contemplating business activities producing passive income (such as dividends, royalties,
and rdnts) distributed to the trust beneficiaries, the income is
taxed to the beneficiaries and not to the trust.11 However, in the
business trust where there is participation in an active business,
additional considerations arise which may remove it from its
status as a trust and cause it to be treated as an association taxable as a corporation.
Litigation of this issue resulted in considerable confusion until the United States Supreme Court held in the landmark case
of Morrissey v. Commissionerl1 that the term association used in
the definition of corporation meant resemblance to the corporate
form rather than identity with it. Thus, an entity will be held
taxable as a corporation if it is organized in such a way as to
contain the attributes of a corporation. The Supreme Court isolated these attributes as centralized management, continuity of
life, limited liability, and free transferability of interest. These
attributes later became integrated into the income tax regulations defining a corporation for tax purposes.1 3
Several years later the Morrissey decision was employed by a
taxpayer seeking corporate tax treatment. In United States v.
9. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3): "The term 'corporation' includes
associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."
10. The object of the Massachusetts Trust or Business Trust was to obtain
for the associates most of the advantages of corporations without the restrictions
and regulations imposed by law on them. 12 C.J.S. Business Trust § 2 (1938).
'11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 662.
12. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). See also, Pelton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), holding a medical group to be an association
and thus taxable as a corporation.
13. See regulations to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3797-a(2) and (3).
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Kintner,14 a group of doctors, not capable of incorporating under
state law, formed a trust with terms sufficient to bring it within

the Morrissey decision. By so obtaining corporate tax status, the
member doctors were allowed tax deductions for a pension plan
and other benefits not otherwise available to partnerships or
individuals. The Commissioner's arguments against corporate
tax status were met with the Morrissey rule and his own regulations. The Commissioner elected not to appeal to the Supreme
Court, but he did issue regulations directed against corporate
status of professionals indicating his unwillingness to follow
Kintner. 5
Professional groups were quick to realize the tax benefits
available if they could obtain corporate tax status. Fearful that
the Commissioner's regulations would effectively put an end to
the results achieved in the Kintner case, these professional
groups sought state legislation authorizing the incorporation of
professional service groups such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants. This legislation was drafted to counter objections by
maintaining the ethical standards of professional men. The Louisiana statutes are representative and will be considered in detail
below.
The Commissioner, holding firm to his previous position, issued new regulations to counter the activities of the various
state legislatures and the infant professional service corporations.1 6 The effect of these regulations was to deny corporate tax
status to professional corporations because of insufficient corporate characteristics. Here the rationale of the Morrissey case
is used in reverse. If an association can be taxed as a corporation
because it resembles the corporate form, it follows that a corporation not having corporate characteristics can be taxed as
the entity it most closely resembles. The Commissioner does not
believe a professional corporation can be considered a corporation for tax purposes because of the unique personal relationship
which arises between the professional and his client or patient.
LOUISIANA'S PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION AND THE
KINTNER REGULATIONS

The Louisiana Legal and Medical Corporations Acts 17 are
identical in substance; thus for the purpose of this article legal
14.
15.
16.
17.

216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1), (2), and (3) (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
Professional Law Corporations Act, LA. R.S. 12:801-815 (Supp. 1969);
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and medical corporations will be considered collectively and
termed "professional corporations." This term as used here applies only to legal and medical corporations and should not be
confused with the term used in its broadest meaning as including
any professional service. Some state statutes are drawn broadly
to include all professional services without designating any particular profession. 18
Both Louisiana acts state
"One or more natural persons, of full age and duly licensed
to practice law [medicine] in this state, may form a corporation under Chapter 1 of this Title for the purpose of practicing law [medicine]. Such corporation shall be subject to all
of the provisions of Chapter 1, . . . except to the extent that
such provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Chapter."' 1
The official Comment states that the legislative intention is that
professional corporations be the same as ordinary business corporations subject only to the special rules necessitated by the peculiar relationship between lawyer and client or doctor and patient. Thus, professional corporations should have the characteristics of ordinary corporations including continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability
of interest.2° Therefore, in order to fully examine the Louisiana
professional corporation, the Morrissey attributes of corporateness will serve as a guide.
Continuity of Life
The first question is whether the Louisiana acts provide the
professional corporation with continuity of life. Continuity of
life, as that term is generally understood, means that the entity
will continue to exist regardless of its owners' existence. This
factor clearly distinguishes a partnership from a corporation.
The Louisiana acts specially provide that an additional
ground for involuntary dissolution of a professional corporation
will be the absence of voting shareholders. 2 Furthermore, under
a special provision, a shareholder is not entitled to vote his share
or participate in earnings when the shareholder is a person not
Professional Medical Corporations Act, LA. R.S. 12:901-915 (Supp. 1969).
18. E.g. see Florida's Professional Service Corporation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
eh. 621 (1961).
19. LA. R.S. 12:802, 902 (Supp.1969).
20. See Comment to LA.R.S. 12:802, 902 (Supp. 1969).
21. Id. 12:813, 913.
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licensed to practice law or medicine in this state.2 2 It becomes
obvious, therefore, that the professional corporation, unlike the
ordinary business corporation, is subject to the hazard of limited
life should all of its shares fall into the hands of persons not
authorized to practice law or medicine. However, this particular
limitation on the life of the professional corporation seems more
imaginary than real since a shareowner who is not authorized to
vote or participate in the earnings is not likely to retain such an
asset for long. Rather, the professional corporation will probably
make provision for disposition of the terminating shareholder's
interest through a shareholders' agreement or a provision on the
stock certificate calling for a compulsory offer of shares to the
corporation or other shareholders. 23 Such an agreement is desirable because the remaining shareholders will want the power to
forestall the possibility of having to work with a person not of
their own choosing. Under these circumstances the life of the
professional corporation should be considered continuous even
though a small possibility of its demise exists.
The Income Tax Regulations take a narrower view of professional corporations by contending that continuity of life is lacking if the right to share in profits is contingent upon the shareholder's establishing and maintaining an employment relationship with the organization.2 4 Further, if the shareholder is required to dispose of his interest upon termination of employment or death, the continuing existence of the professional corporation depends upon the willingness or unwillingness of the
other members to buy his share or accept the terminating shareowner's proposed successor.2 5 The Commissioner regards this as
a limitation on the continuing existence of the professional corporation.
The Louisiana acts, taken alone, would pass the Commissioner's test for continuity of life. The statutes do not require an employment relationship for a shareowner to participate in earn26
ings, nor do they require a first refusal clause. Imposition of
these restrictions is left to the discretion of the corporation members who must take into consideration personal preferences and
27
ethical standards.
22. Id. 12:805, 905.
23. Id. 12:806(C), 906(C). Note that under the legislation any restrictions
on the transfer of shares must be stated on the stock certificate representing the
share.
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (2) (1965).
25. Id.
26. LA. R.S. 12:805(B), 905(B) (Supp. 1969).
27. The American Bar Association has indicated that it is not against pro-
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It is perhaps the ethical standards coupled with the desirable
results of a first refusal clause which will bring the corporation
within the Commissioner's prohibition.
Centralizationof Management
The second question is whether the professional corporation
has centralizationof management. The Louisiana statutes retain
28
centralized management through a board of directors. 1
Directors must be voting shareholders.29 Presumably this was
legislative recognition of the ethical standards imposed on professionals.30 The powers of management of a professional corporation may well appear to be as encompassing as those of an
ordinary corporation. Again, however, ethical considerations
have intervened to qualify the directors' powers. 31 The most important ethical limitation is that each professional must decide
which cases to handle and the procedure for obtaining desired
results. The professional must be left to his own designs and not
directed to act in a certain way by a central committee. Thus, it
can be seen that management of a professional corporation cannot be centralized to the degree possible in an ordinary business
corporation.
This limitation is considered by the regulations to be fatal to
corporate tax treatment. 32 The distinction made by the Commissioner here seems illogical. The regulations measure the viability
of a professional corporation's management group against that
of the traditional corporation whereas a more logical approach
would be to measure it against what ordinary business corporations may do to limit management's authority under state law.
A family corporation may find it desirable to limit management
power at least as much if not more than ethics and law limit it
in a professional corporation. Whether centralized management
exists would then turn upon whether there is a valid distinction
fessional ethics to incorporate if certain safeguards are provided. 1. Lawyers
rendering services to the client must remain personally responsible to the client,
and any restrictions on the liability of other lawyers in the organization must
be made clear to him. 2. The lawyer must decide which clients to represent and
what cases to bring or defend. Therefore, management can be composed of lawyers
alone. 3. Non-lawyers should not be allowed to vote shares or participate in earnings in order to prevent division of fees without division of responsibility. ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 303 (1961). Although the Louisiana statutes do not require an emnloyment relationship to vote or share in earnings, it is implicit that one must exist.
28. See Comment to LA. R.S. 12:810 (Supp. 1969).
29. Id. 12:810, 910.
30. See note 27 supra.
31. Id.
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (3) (1965).
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between limiting management's power by self determination and
doing so because ethics and law require it.
Limited Liability
The Louisiana legislation states that shareholders of a professional corporation are liable only for the subscription price of
their shares.83 A shareholder is not personally liable for any
debt or liability of the corporation. 4 However, as in the ordinary
corporation, employees are fully liable for fraud or for any
breach of professional duty or for other negligent or wrongful
acts.35 Thus, it would appear that the concept of limited liability
is the same as that of an ordinary corporation. Notice to the
public that it is dealing with a corporation and that its liability
is limited is provided for by requiring the corporate name to end
with "A Professional Corporation" or the like. 6 These provisions were indicated by the American Bar Association as neces37
sary to comply with applicable canons of ethics.
The Regulations indicate that a professional corporation lacks
the attribute of limited liability if personal liability of its members
is greater in any respect than that of a shareholder-employee of
an ordinary business corporation. 8 If under local law or rules
pertaining to professional practice a mutual agency relationship
exists between members, liability is not limited. 9
Louisiana's status in this regard is unclear. The legislation is
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant a reading either way.40 However, judging from the expressed purpose of having the rules of
ordinary corporations apply in the absence of special provision
and the presence of the notice giving provision, it seems to have
been the intent of the legislature to abrogate the liability rule
applicable to partnerships and adopt the rule of liability associated with corporations. Therefore, it appears that under the
regulations a Louisiana professional corporation would have
limited liability.
Free Transferabilityof Interest
The Louisiana professional corporation acts provide that
shares of such a corporation are freely transferable. 41 However,
33. LA. R.S. 12:807(A), 907(A) (Supp. 1969).
34. Id. 12:807(B), 907(B).
35. Id. 12:807(C), 907(C).

36. Id. 12:803, 903.
37. See note 27 supra.

38. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (4) (1965).
39. Id.

40. See Comment to LA. R.S. 12:807 (Supp. 1969).
41. See Comment (a) to id. 12:805.
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since only those shareholders authorized to practice their professions in this state may vote shares, engage in management, or
share in profits, finding a market may prove difficult.
The Commissioner's position is that for a professional corporation to have free transferabilityof interest the shareowner
must be able to transfer, without the consent of the other members, not only the right to share in profits but also an employment relationship. 42 The reasoning seems to be that if the right
to share in profits is contingent upon the existence of an employment relationship freedom to transfer an interest does not
exist in actuality unless both can be sold without the concurrence
of the other members. The inclusion of a first refusal clause will
be a substantial hindrance upon free transferability of interest
because it places transfer determination in the hands of the
4 3
members of the corporation.
The Louisiana statutes under consideration apparently do not
require an employment relationship to share in earnings or to
vote. 4 4 License io practice is all that is required. Professional
ethics, however, would again seem to demand an employment relationship to prevent the practice of fee-splitting which is forbidden for lawyers and presumably for medical doctors as well.
The Commissioner's position seems to be valid since there Would
seem to be a substantial limitation on the freedom of a shareholder to transfer his interest. A prospective buyer would be reluctant unless assured his investment would yield a return.
Recent Cases
The cases litigating the tax status of professional corporations have been unanimous in deciding that the Kintner Regulations are invalid. 45 The decisions are based on two grounds.
First, the Regulations are discriminatory in that a more strict
regulation applies to professionals than to others. Second, the
courts have found the Regulations beyond the scope of the Commissioner's authority because the Internal Revenue Code provides
that a partnership is something other than an incorporatedentity. 4 Therefore, since these entities are incorporated, they can42. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (1965).
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
LA. R.S. 12:805, 905 (Supp. 1969). See also note 27 supra.
See note 8 supra.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701-(a) (2)
"(a) When used in this title,

where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof"(2)

Partnership and partners.-The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate,
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not be partnerships. The Commissioner argued that state law
should not control and that federal law should allow the court to
look beyond the form and inquire into the substance as in the
Morrissey case. The courts indicated that when the entity is incorporated under state law further inquiry is unnecessary, for
7
this would go beyond the legal requirements.4
Final determination of this issue is not far off. The recent
flurry of cases and their successful outcome is bound to stimulate new interest among the professionals. The Commissioner
will be obligated to litigate the issue until a final determination
is reached. In the end there may be action by Congress. In the
past Congress has not chosen to detail an objective definition of
corporation.4 However, certain corporations have been singled
out to be taxed in a particular way, such as personal holding
corporations, 49 insurance companies, 0 and investment companies.5 1 From this it can be seen that the pattern heretofore established by Congress has not been to create a federal definition
of corporateness but instead to deal with particular problems as
they arise by amendment to the Code. The creation and regulation of corporations have unquestionably always been legitimate
activities of the states.5 2 If the court continues to hold professional corporations taxable as regular corporations, any change
must come from Congress either by special provision or by expanding the Code's definition of corporateness to thus give that
term a federal meaning apart from state law.
CONCLUSION

Although, at the present time, the way seems clear for professionals to incorporate, there are hazards involved should the
current trend reverse. Beyond the risk of being drawn into extended litigation with the Commissioner and the possibility of
Supreme Court reversal of the lower courts, there is the hazard
that professional corporations will be regulated either by Congress, under the taxing authority, or by the Louisiana Supreme
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization.
(Emphasis
added.)
47. A broad policy question which may be asked is whether the various state
legislatures should have the power to interfere with the federal taxing authority
by passing legislation having no object other than providing a means of avoiding
a federal tax. Are not the states which have passed professional corporation acts
really regulating the incident of tax?
48. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701-(a) (3).
49. Id. §§ 541-547.
50. Id. §§ 801-843.
51. Id. §§ 851-855.
52. See Empey v. United States, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
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Court, or Board of Medical Examiners, under their
power to
53
regulate the respective legal or medical professions.
The chance that these hazards will materialize seems small,
and the more aggressive professionals may wish immediate corporate status. Others may assume a wait-and-see approach while
taking advantage of a congressionally approved pension plan
under H.R. 10.
It would seem desirable for Congress to take the initiative to
relieve professionals and other self-employed persons from having to change their organizational form solely to gain a tax advantage now available to others. Nothing in the literature advances any reason why the corporate form should enjoy tax
advantage over other forms of business. This anomalous situation creates not only a discriminatory effect on tax liability but
also an undue burden on those incorporating purely for tax
benefits.
Larry J. Gunn
DUTY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
IN LOUISIANA
"Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders, and shall
discharge the duties of their respective positions in good
faith, and with that diligence, care, judgment and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. ''1
Thus Section 91 of the new Louisiana Business Corporation Law
defines the duty of corporate officers and directors in Louisiana.
It is identical with Section 36 of the 1928 Corporation Act 2 with
the notable exception that it specifically extends the fiduciary
relationship of officers and directors to shareholders. The 1928
provision was in turn taken almost verbatim from the Model
Business Corporation Act.3 The Commissioners' Notes to the
Model Act point out it was necessary to specify the standard of
care to which officers and directors would be held due to the
conflict among decisions. 4 Prior to 1928, some courts interpreting
53. LA. R.S. 12:814, 914 (Supp. 1969).
1. LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968).
2. La. Acts 1928, No. 250, § 36.
3. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (1928).

This Model Act is

also known as

the Uniform Business Corporation Act and was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1928. It is to be distinguished
from the later ABA-ALI Model Business CorporationAct.

4. 5 LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. 225 Comment (West 1951).

